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Abstract over the last 10 years, russia under putin has turned into an illiberal 
empire that is determined to weaken the west as a precondition for its own survival. 
This fact is still not fully appreciated by those western leaders who believe that a return 
to cooperation with russia is both necessary and possible. Germany’s Social Demo-
crats are particularly prominent among these leaders. They intend to use Germany’s 
2016 presidency of the organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to lay the 
groundwork for a step-by-step confidence-building effort, eventually leading to a new 
European security architecture. Such hopes are utterly futile. They are based on old 
illusions about détente and Ostpolitik. Moreover, they are understood by the Kremlin 
to be signs of weakness and appeasement. instead of answering every russian act of 
aggression with new offers for talks, the west should prepare for a long confrontation 
with russia, maintain unity, and strengthen defence and deterrence.
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Motto of the German OSCE presidency (OSCE 2016).
Introduction
when Germany took over the presidency of the organization for Security and Co-oper-
ation in Europe (oSCE) in January 2016, its ambitions were high. For months, German 
Foreign Minister Frank walter Steinmeier had been doing an interesting double act of 
simultaneously raising the stakes and dampening exaggerated expectations (auswär-
tiges amt 2015). But one thing was clear: Germany’s presidency was going to become 
a text-book example of soft power working to solve hard security problems. it would 
also help to boost the image of the German Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische 
partei Deutschlands)—the troubled junior partner in the coalition with Chancellor Mer-
kel’s Christian Democratic union (Christlich Demokratische union).
The idea looked simple enough: without officially watering down the west’s rejection 
of russia’s violation of basic European principles through the annexation of Crimea 
and its ‘involvement’ in Eastern ukraine, a new effort would be made to return to con-
fidence building. Step by step, lost trust would be re-established in a three-pronged 
approach. First, there would be pragmatic cooperation on issues of global relevance, 
such as nuclear non-proliferation, fighting terrorism and stabilising the Middle East. This 
element, of course, would not be tied to the oSCE and would happen under uS lead-
ership—but it would nevertheless be essential to what was to follow. in parallel, the 
oSCE would help to solidify the ceasefire under the Minsk ii agreement. and this, it 
was hoped, could eventually lead to a lasting peaceful solution to the war in ukraine. 
alongside this, the Eu would reach out to the Eurasian union in some kind of structured 
cooperation. This was considered a particularly smart move by many in Berlin and Brus-
sels, who believed it would allow the Eu to improve relations with russia while officially 
upholding the boycott that is in place as a result of russia’s aggression since 2014. 
Then, at an unspecified future date, a process could be established to create, together 
with russia, a new rules-based system in Europe—possibly even something deserv-
ing of the title ‘new European Security architecture’. Hence, a ‘new Helsinki’ would be 
the final outcome. Some of these elements, especially the pattern of looking for ways 
to rebuild confidence with russia by simply sidelining the ukraine topic and looking at 
the Eurasian union as a potential partner, had already been proposed by Eu High rep-
resentative Federica Mogherini in a semi-official paper in early 2015 (Foreign affairs 
Council 2015).
The rationale for these actions was twofold. First, there was the concern that any fur-
ther escalation between russia and the west, whether over ukraine or any other prob-
lem, must be prevented—lest it lead to an increasing risk of all-out war. Second, it was 
thought that cooperation with russia on many issues is badly needed and that the cur-
rent stand-off between the west and russia is therefore untenable.
5 EuropEan ViEw (2016) 15:3–11
1 3
What part of ‘no’ don’t we understand?
alas, by mid-2016, and halfway into Germany’s oSCE presidency, very little has been 
achieved. Minister Steinmeier himself is visibly frustrated, but that only seems to rein-
force his dogged determination not to give up. The only field in which there has been 
any progress (although this may only be in the eye of the beholder) is in the Middle 
Eastern dossier with Syria and iran. otherwise, the deadlock is visible on many fronts. 
First of all, Minsk ii is in limbo. none of the strategic elements of the ceasefire negoti-
ated in February 2015 looks closer to being implemented, more than a year after its 
conclusion. The number of incidents may be significantly lower than in early 2015, but 
the ceasefire is being violated on a daily basis, with an increasing tendency, and in 
90 % of all cases by rebel forces and russians.1 on none of the other important points 
has there been any palpable progress: not in the withdrawal of foreign troops (i.e. rus-
sians) from the Donbas, not in the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front line, not 
in re-establishing ukrainian control of the eastern border, nor in carrying out internation-
ally observed, free elections in the Donbas. Consequently, Eu sanctions against russia 
are being upheld, albeit with grumbling from italy, austria, Hungary, Greece and certain 
other member states (Kanter 2015). So far, it has been Chancellor Merkel who has kept 
the sanctions in place, despite these misgivings. Her firmness vis-à-vis russia is in 
stark contrast to the attitudes of both of the smaller coalition partners in Berlin—the 
Social Democrats and the Bavarian Christian Social union (Christlich-Soziale union in 
Bayern).
what is more, cooperation with the Eurasian union is not in sight—largely because 
that organisation is in no way comparable to the Eu, and most Central European mem-
bers of the Eu would hardly approve.
An error wrapped in a fantasy inside a delusion
Consequently, a sense of frustration and disappointment is palpable in the corridors of 
Berlin and Brussels. and yet, none of this should come as a surprise. The plan for slow 
confidence building was built on false premises. The first and foremost of these is a fun-
damental misperception of the character of putin’s russia. Second, a fundamental error 
has been made in assessing the nature of both the current conflict between russia and 
the west, and the one between russia and its neighbourhood, above all ukraine. and 
third, these two mistakes have led to an erroneous assumption about what is achiev-
able, and desirable, in Europe.
on the characteristics of russia under putin, much has been written in recent years. 
The issue concerns russia’s centralised power structure, which is focused on putin, 
1 although the oSCE is committed to blaming ‘both sides’ for violations in their daily reports, western 
diplomats are ready to admit in private conversations that those violations almost always come from the 
russian/rebel side.
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but also the amalgam between the state administration, the justice system, the armed 
services, business, organised crime and right-wing ideologues (Gessen 2013). There 
is also a huge volume of literature on putin’s attempts to recreate the russian Empire 
(Lucas 2014). putin’s list of priorities has been widely discussed and focuses on staying 
in power for as long as possible, which is why, from his viewpoint, a russian Maidan 
has to be prevented. in turn, this is why no successful democracy can be allowed to 
exist within russia’s neighbourhood, which thus leads to the manifest intention to 
weaken naTo and the Eu (Freudenstein 2015).
Herein lies the second error of the confidence-building plan: the nature of russia’s 
conflict with the west. Steinmeier and many of his colleagues in other Eu member 
states, as well as his comrades among the Social Democrats and, to be honest, many 
European conservatives as well, are still pretending that we are living in some kind of 
bad dream. They hope that putin will either suddenly wake up and realise the damage 
he is doing to Europe and his own country or that he and the people around him will at 
least slowly begin to understand the issue—with the help of a sympathetic west which 
admits its own mistakes in getting to where we are. what all these actors are incapable 
of seeing is that instead, this conflict has largely mutated into a zero-sum game, not 
only in the eyes of putin himself, but in those of virtually the entire russian elite.
another good example of the character of East–west delusions is the debate around 
the positioning of troops on naTo’s eastern flank. The proper reaction to russian 
aggression, and the one most abhorred by the confidence builders, would be a perma-
nent deployment of significant numbers of new troops, such as one or several brigades. 
This is precisely what poland, romania and the Baltic states are hoping for. But there is 
no consensus for this move among naTo’s 28 member states. This is why the best that 
they will get at the July 2016 warsaw Summit is a boost to rotational deployment. Mili-
tarily, this may or may not make up for permanent ‘boots on the ground’, but politically 
the allies’ refusal to build bases sends exactly the wrong signal to Moscow. The real 
rationale for ‘persistent’ instead of ‘permanent’ deployment is purportedly the dogged 
determination of leading naTo members to stick to the unilateral declaration added to 
the naTo–russia Founding act.2 in this text, the west pledges not to deploy significant 
numbers of troops to former warsaw pact countries. This is supposed to signal to rus-
sia how much we would appreciate a return to normality. alas, it is read in Moscow as 
another sign of western weakness and indecision.
now, according to what we know, a ‘return to the status quo ante’ is impossible with 
putin’s russia—that much is even admitted by the ‘confidence builders’, and is being 
emphasised by the russians themselves all the time (Trenin 2016; Kortunov 2016). 
Steinmeier and his colleagues, however, still cling to the fantasy that a situation can 
and must be achieved in which russia’s security demands are met while the post–Cold 
war values of a Europe ‘whole and free’ are upheld. But this is impossible. anything 
2 whether Chancellor Merkel’s apparent endorsement of this determination represents her convictions or 
is the result of a compromise with the Social Democrats, is an open question. But the result is the same in 
either case.
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that would come close to satisfying russia would be equivalent to recognising spheres 
of influence, and therefore telling Eastern Europeans that they have to live in a state of 
diminished sovereignty because they are, unfortunately, living in the wrong place at the 
wrong time: that is, they are neighbours of putin’s russia. Moreover, the west would 
have to refrain from any attempts to support democracy beyond the eastern borders of 
the Eu, forget about the enlargement of either the Eu or naTo, and recognise russia’s 
right to support every tyrant allied to Moscow throughout the rest of the world. none of 
this is acceptable if the west wants to remain faithful to its fundamental values in any 
significant way. To make it abundantly clear: putin demands nothing less than giving up 
the spirit of the paris Charter of 1990, even the spirit of Helsinki in 1975, and returning 
to a very specific interpretation of Yalta in 1945.
However, even if there was such a comprehensive deal, it is very doubtful whether 
the relative stability of the Cold war could be recreated with russia under putin. one 
of the russian president’s trademarks of recent years has been his incalculability—
which is also proof of the strong personalisation of russia’s power structure. if, as many 
observers claim, the violation of internationally agreed rules has become an element 
of identity for the new russia, then no ‘grand bargain’ will ever survive over a longer 
period of time with a russia that rejects the very idea of rules.
of course, against this backdrop, one might still argue that there is no harm in at 
least trying to reach an equitable deal with russia because, as the saying goes, 
talking is better than shooting. The first problem with this truism is that by the time it is 
uttered, the shooting has usually been going on for quite a while, just not by the west—
as demonstrated by the situation in Donbas. So the alternative is not war or peace, 
but different degrees of violence at best. But the second and more important danger is 
that the obsession with negotiating deals is the wrong message to send to Moscow. if 
every russian act of aggression is answered with an appeal to ‘both sides’ to ‘exercise 
restraint’, with a ‘de-escalating move’ and an offer of talks, putin will draw the conclu-
sion that he can just continue to shred the rules of post–Cold war Europe, as we have 
seen. arguably, it was not Steinmeier’s calls for de-escalation that saved Mariupol and 
the other East ukrainian cities from assault by russian and rebel forces in the autumn 
of 2014 and early 2015, but the west’s imposition of sanctions and russia’s fear that 
even more might follow. Moreover, the obsession with talking in the face of russian 
aggression also sends a devastating signal to all democrats in Eastern Europe: it cor-
roborates their fear that a ‘russia first’ attitude still reigns in western Europe, that the 
west does not stand up for its proclaimed values and that their own attempts to defy 
russia’s imperial claims are doomed to fail.
However, if it is so clear that there will be neither a return to Cold war stability nor a 
grand bargain for a new European security architecture (because both would be totally 
incompatible with our values, and very probably unsustainable for putin’s russia any-
way)—then we need to answer the question of why so many European politicians are 
still deluding themselves.
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The phantom pain of Ostpolitik
Many factors come to mind when trying to explain the blindness to the facts of the con-
fidence builders all over western Europe, and in parts of washington as well. Depend-
ing on the individual case, there is fear of military confrontation as well as disinterest 
in supporting democracy in Eastern Europe, and there is profit seeking as well as a 
genuine admiration for russia and even putin—or various combinations of the above. 
russian influence is often a factor, but it is only one among many. Even Germany’s 
Christian Democrats are not immune to the aversion to conflict and preference for dia-
logue inherent in western democracy. But in the case of the German SpD, there is 
one particular motivation: in order to understand German Foreign Minister Steinmeier’s 
inability to grasp the basic realities of putin’s russia and the Eu’s Eastern neighbour-
hood, one has to reach back into the twentieth century and look at the strategic concept 
of Ostpolitik. This strategy began as ‘change through rapprochement’ (Wandel durch 
Annäherung) in 1963 and reached its heyday in the late 1960s and the early 1970s 
under Chancellor willy Brandt.
under this strategy, recognition of the status quo between the blocs, including the parti-
tion of post-war Germany, was to become the precondition for overcoming this status quo. 
Trade and civil society connections would facilitate the process. in other words, especially 
in its early phase, Ostpolitik was a kind of peaceful regime-change strategy. of course, 
none of this was possible without the uS-led détente, within which the concept was quickly 
embedded. in a way, the same principle used in the case of Germany was applied to 
East–west relations in general. This reached its climax in 1975, with the Helsinki Final 
act. Ostpolitik was not only an important foreign policy initiative from post-war west Ger-
many, but was, above all, German Social Democracy’s only contribution to world politics 
in the second half of the twentieth century. This goes a long way to explaining the zeal 
with which Social Democrats in the twenty-first century have dealt with russia, including its 
increasing aggression under putin since 2007. it was during Gerhard Schröder’s chancel-
lorship that the idea of a ‘modernisation partnership’ between the west and russia was 
born. in essence, this was nothing but an extension of ‘change through rapprochement’: 
russia would, step by step and encouraged by incentives of economic, technological and 
cultural cooperation, adopt standards such as the rule of law, checks and balances, plural-
ist democracy and, eventually, a truly cooperative foreign and security policy.
There are three fundamental problems with this approach. The first two become obvi-
ous when looking at Ostpolitik’s track record in its later stages, in the early 1980s. Ger-
man Social Democracy made two fateful mistakes at the time. in 1980 and 1981, it sided 
with the polish Communists during the imposition of martial law against the Solidarity 
(Solidarność) trade union, which had become a pro-democracy movement. Like dissi-
dent groups in other warsaw pact countries, Solidarity openly and deliberately invoked 
the principles of the Helsinki Final act. in that situation, and lamely appealing to realpolitik, 
the SpD forsook the original regime-change idea of Ostpolitik, and declared Solidarity a 
danger to world peace. its position was in sharp contrast to that of Mitterrand’s France, 
Thatcher’s Britain and reagan’s uS, all of whom did their utmost to condemn Gen-
eral Jaruzelski’s crack-down, enact sanctions against his regime and support the polish 
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opposition in every way possible. in other words, when Ostpolitik finally showed results, 
German Social Democrats behaved like the sorcerer’s apprentice, desperately trying to 
undo what they themselves had started.
Second, détente was always accompanied by the upholding of deterrence, and so was 
Ostpolitik, initially (Techau 2016). By the early 1980s, however, the SpD under Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt had been rocked by a ‘peace movement’ opposed to the deployment of 
the intermediate range nuclear weapons that mainstream politicians considered indispen-
sable to maintaining deterrence. as a result, Schmidt’s party refused to follow the logic of 
deterrence alongside dialogue any longer, opted for unilateral disarmament, and began a 
decade-long cycle of appeasement and irresponsibility in foreign and security policy.
The third problem with this approach, which became apparent in the late 2000s, is 
what the ‘modernisation partnership’ with putin’s russia has achieved. not only has this 
partnership not contributed to moving russia closer to democracy and the rule of law, 
but it has had the opposite effect. russia is using the increased economic and societal 
ties brought about by this relationship to boost its own influence in the west through 
hybrid methods such as corruption and information warfare. The amalgam of russian 
business, state structures, intelligence services and even organised crime has, in many 
Eu member states, successfully penetrated society. Slovakia and the Czech republic 
are cases in point. instead of us ‘westernising’ russia, russia has corrupted us.
These issues are not the fault of German Social Democrats alone, but they bear a 
good part of the responsibility. what can be seen here is a very peculiar obsession with 
past successes, a failure to fully face the truth about where the SpD went against its 
own principles and wishful thinking about the grim reality of doing business with russia 
under putin.
What is to be done?
what is the alternative to the doomed approach of trying to return to a cooperative rela-
tionship with putin’s russia, let alone a new grand bargain? The answer is that there 
will be—there has to be—a long stand-off. The other alternative would be the end of the 
west as we know it. putin is now betting that the west will not last in its current form, 
and he is trying to give a helping hand to its end with his hybrid methods and support 
for extremist parties in the Eu. our best bet is to hope that putin and his system will 
go before he succeeds, while preventing all-out war (through maintaining and actually 
rebuilding deterrence). Hence, a long confrontation lies ahead of us.
Meanwhile, there will and should be areas of cooperation, mostly in the context of the 
un, and on topics such as nuclear proliferation, fighting islamic State and other fields 
of common interest which still exist. But this will be limited to specific topics and will not 
develop into comprehensive cooperation on global security—if only for the simple rea-
son that putin’s russia is diametrically opposed to the west on so many questions of 
global democracy and the rule of law.
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one other field in which there should be more cooperation is extending the mecha-
nisms for fast emergency communication in case of military incidents, especially at sea 
and in the air. This may be the only valid rationale for reviving the naTo–russia Coun-
cil, because on all other points it will only serve to confirm that we agree to disagree.
as to the oSCE, the contact group on ukraine and the observer mission in Donbas 
should not be suspended by the west, but their dwindling relevance should be clearly 
acknowledged. no strengthening of oSCE structures will help to paper over the existing 
cracks between the west and ukraine on the one hand and russia on the other. The 
idea of making russia, the aggressor, part of the institutional framework meant to solve 
the confrontation, was a bad one to begin with.
Most importantly, and building on the naTo summits of wales in 2014 and the 
upcoming one in warsaw in 2016, the west will have to further strengthen its defences 
in order to reconstruct military deterrence. of all the policy elements that have been lost 
in the last 25 years, the spirit of deterrence is one of the most important—a fact that the 
confidence builders have not sufficiently appreciated, to put it mildly.
Finally, Germany—and this goes well beyond Social Democracy—must let go of 
the habit of promoting a very unhealthy German–russian bilateralism. This concerns 
‘hard’ issues, such as energy security: the nord Stream ii pipeline project is politically 
devastating for energy solidarity in Europe. in Central Europe it evokes justified fears 
of a rapallo-like German–russian deal behind their backs and against the interests of 
countries such as poland, ukraine and the Baltic states. it also concerns ‘soft’ issues, 
such as the many formal and informal communication formats Germany and russia 
have developed over the last 25 years. These have miraculously survived even the 
boldest russian aggression against the fundamental values of post–Cold war Europe, 
and crack-downs on civil society and western non-governmental organisations in 
russia itself. in fact, the confidence builders consider conferences such as the St 
petersburg Dialogue to be even more necessary ‘in times of crisis’. But as long as it 
is only Germans talking to russians, these events send precisely the wrong signal to 
Central Europeans (see above) and to the russian side, which must have the impres-
sion that Germany can still somehow be pried away from its western allies into some 
kind of special relationship with russia. Hence, this format should be either enlarged 
to include participants from Central Europe, Eastern Europe and the uS, or scrapped 
altogether.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons attribution 
License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original 
author(s) and the source are credited.
References
auswärtiges amt. (2015). Deutscher oSZE-Vorsitz 2016: Brücken der Zusammenar-
beit bauen [German chairmanship of the oSCE 2016: Building bridges of cooperation]. 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/sid_B16D434D73C1480aB8582CD1aECB8B41/DE/
11
 EuropEan ViEw (2016) 15:3–11
1 3
aussenpolitik/Friedenspolitik/oSZE/aktuell/151112_Steinmeier_Bundestag_oSZE_Vor-
sitz_node.html. accessed 25 april 2016.
Foreign affairs Council. (2015). issues paper on relations with russia. Financial Times. 
http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/files/2015/01/russia.pdf. accessed 25 april 2016.
Freudenstein, r. (2015). Facing up to the bear: Confronting Putin’s Russia. wilfried 
Martens Centre for European Studies. Brussels. http://www.martenscentre.eu/publica-
tions/facing-bear-confronting-putin%E2%80%99s-russia-european-view-free-article. 
accessed 25 april 2016.
Gessen, M. (2013). The man without a face: The unlikely rise of Vladimir Putin. new 
York: riverhead Books.
Kanter, J. (2015). italy delays E.u.’s renewal of sanctions against russia. The New 
York Times, 14 December. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/world/europe/italy-
delays-eus-renewal-of-sanctions-against-russia.html?_r=1. accessed 24 april 2016.
Kortunov, a. (2016). How not to talk to Russia. European Council on Foreign relations. 
1 april. http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_how_not_to_talk_with_russia_6053. 
accessed 25 april 2016.
Lucas, E. (2014). The new Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the threat to the West. new 
York: St. Martin’s press.
oSCE. (2016). oSCE participating states, in landmark decision, agree to expand list of 
measures to reduce risk of tensions arising from cyber activities. 10 March. http://www.
osce.org/cio/226656. accessed 2 May 2016.
Techau, J. (2016). The forgotten robustness of détente. Carnegie Europe. Brussels.  
5 april. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=63228. accessed 9 May 2016.
Trenin, D. (2016). A five year outlook for Russian foreign policy: Demands, drivers, and 
influences. Carnegie Moscow Center, Task Force white paper. 18 March. http://carn-
egie.ru/2016/03/18/five-year-outlook-for-russian-foreign-policy-demands-drivers-and-
influences/ivkm. accessed 21 april 2016.
Roland Freudenstein is the Policy Director at the Wilfried Martens Centre 
for European Studies.
